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R&D is a main driver of growth, whether by generating new ideas for production or increasing
technological transfer. However, R&D itself is risky and faces numerous barriers which may reduce
its marginal return. Direct R&D subsides are intended to counteract such barriers, but whether
they lead empirically to increased economic growth is unclear. In our structural model of the UK,
subsidies o¤set the frictional costs associated with R&D, incentivising innovation and so stimulating
productivity growth. We estimate and test this structural model by indirect inference, a method not
previously used in work on R&D. We nd that even temporary cuts to R&D funding have long-lasting
impacts on UK economic growth. The power of the test allows us to calculate tight accuracy bounds
for our results and for policy reform impacts calculated using the model. These ndings are of high
relevance to the ongoing debate around the future UK innovation environment.
JEL Codes: E00 O00 O38 O50
Keywords: R&D, economic growth, Total Factor Productivity (TFP), UK, indirect inference,
DSGE
1. INTRODUCTION
Have government subsidies to private sector research and development boosted UK growth
over the past four decades? That is the question tackled in this paper. Starting with Schultz
(1953) and Griliches (1958), an inuential literature links R&D activity to economic growth,
and the R&D growth channel is now taken as given by many. However, at the macroeconomic
level the causal link between direct subsidies, R&D and successful innovation remains less
empirically certain.
This paper therefore takes an empirical look at a structural model which embeds that key
growth hypothesis. The research question is whether direct government R&D subsidies have
incentivised the private sector to conduct R&D, and so enhanced innovation and productivity
1Corresponding author: Swansea University Economics Dept, Bay Campus, Fabian Way, Swansea SA1 8EN.
E-mail: Lucy.Minford@Swansea.ac.uk
2The authors would like to acknowledge the constructive suggestions of anonymous referees, the Editor of
this journal and participants at the 49th Annual Conference of the Money, Macro and Finance Research Group
on an earlier version of this paper. This work was funded by the UK Economic and Social Research Council.
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growth in the UK over the sample (1981-2010). To answer it we use indirect inference (Le
et al., 2011), a powerful and relatively new method which has not yet been applied to the
question of R&D subsidy e¤ectiveness.
Private sector R&D is the observable counterpart of the prot-motivated innovation e¤orts
long identied as a driver of technological progress, both by generating ideas for new products
and processes directly (Romer, 1990; Aghion and Howitt, 1992) and by raising an economys
absorptive capacity for ideas generated abroad (Gri¢th et al., 2003).
Intuitively, subsidies to private R&D should encourage that activity at the margin. The
theoretical motive for this government intervention is that projects of high value to society
would not be funded by the private sector otherwise (Arrow, 1962; David et al., 2000). This
might be because important, paradigm-shift innovations: i) have high upfront costs, ii) are
risky with high chance of failure, making capital more di¢cult to raise relative to other ac-
tivities (Bournakis and Mallick, 2018), and iii) on arrival their returns spill over costlessly to
competitors, due to the non-rival and partially non-excludable nature of ideas. The prediction
is that R&D subsidies will raise aggregate productivity growth by correcting private R&D in-
centives, which are otherwise too low for these reasons.3 The theoretical literature is discussed
further in Section 2.
Direct support for business R&D is a key plank of the UK governments industrial strat-
egy, so the policy relevance of this question continues to be high (HM Government, 2017).
The importance of direct R&D subsidies to the private sector is the subject of continuing
debate, however, for several reasons. R&D policy programmes represent a considerable outlay
of public money, but do they actually generate growth? Problems arise when it comes to
testing the e¤ectiveness of these policies. First, innovation itself is di¢cult to measure. R&D
expenditures and patent counts are convenient measurable proxies for innovation outputs in
empirical studies, but how far they capture innovation is questionable (Danguy et al. 2014).
Firms may patent as a signal to capital markets or to earn through licensing revenues, for
instance, a non-innovative activity. Increased R&D expenditures due to subsidies may also be
channelled straight into researcher wage increases, since researcher supply is relatively inelastic
(Goolsbee, 1998). Finally, governments may be bad at picking winners if there is information
asymmetry.4 These theories would predict little relation between direct R&D subsidies and
3For empirical estimates of private and social rates of return, see Hall et al. (2010).
4Hence the increasing use of R&D tax credits; see OECD (2016) and references therein; also Alvarez-Ayuso
et al. (2018).
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aggregate innovation.
The theoretical ambiguity just outlined is not easily resolved empirically, because it is
di¢cult to test the causal impact of R&D subsidies on innovation and aggregate productivity
growth econometrically. See Becker (2015) for a brief discussion of the methodological issues,
as well as a survey of recent empirical work on R&D policy e¤ectiveness.5
This paper therefore takes a structural modelling approach, examining the aggregate impact
of direct R&D subsidies within an identied macroeconomic model of the UK: a Dynamic Sto-
chastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model economy.6 Taking an open economy model which
has been shown elsewhere to account well for the UK macroeconomys behaviour (Meenagh
et al., 2010), we add an unambiguous role for direct R&D subsidies which a¤ect innovation
incentives at the microfoundation level. Individuals weigh up the gain from innovation (R&D)
against the cost of not working in regular labour; the subsidy enters this trade-o¤ by raising
the marginal return to R&D (e¤ectively by lowering associated costs which distort the R&D
decision). That choice in turn implies a systematic relationship from R&D subsidies to produc-
tivity which drives the model economys behaviour. More specically, temporary R&D policy
shocks generate medium-term growth episodes; like Comin and Gertler (2006), we investigate
both short and medium-term business cycle dynamics.
Our key contributions lie in estimating and empirically testing this microfounded model
by indirect inference methods (Le et al., 2011, 2016). This is a statistically powerful test
which rejects misspecied models sensitively, as we establish in the paper using Monte Carlo
methods (cf. Le et al., 2016). The exercise allows us to construct uncertainty bounds around
our estimates and around the quantitative conclusions derived using the model. When we
present the growth impact of a simulated policy reform in Section 4 below, we can then
also give a clear indication of the accuracy of the results. We also test the DSGE models
identication, applying the numerical identication test proposed in Le et al. (2017).
For this reason, the present paper is a useful complement to existing empirical work on the
macroeconomic impact of direct R&D subsidies. By estimating the DSGE model and testing
it in this way, the conclusions cannot be said to rely on an untested calibration.
Further value of the approach taken here lies in the ability to specify a particular causal
5 e.g. macroeconometric regressions (e.g. Bloom et al. 2002) su¤er from potential omitted variable bias, as
R&D policies can be correlated with unobservable drivers of (or obstacles to) innovation. Such econometric
models are essentially reduced forms in which one theory cannot be easily distinguished from another with
quite di¤erent implications (the identication problem).
6The model assumes households and rms follow their economic interests in the face of economic shocks,
subject to market disciplines as assumed in standard economics and allowing for costs of adjusting over time.
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mechanism for growth in the DSGE model; hence there is no question surrounding the ex-
ogeneity of policy in the model. For instance, there is no possibility in the model of reverse
causality such that R&D policy actually responds to growth or to omitted growth drivers,
rather than being a growth determinant itself. This approach therefore bypasses di¢culties
associated with potential regressor endogeneity which are so hard to address conclusively in
macro-level regressions (Becker, 2015), while retaining the idea that hypotheses can be tested
by classical econometric methods (an idea that receives less attention in the DSGE literature).
Another advantage is that we can look at a single country, the UK, without imposing homo-
geneity assumptions across a sample of countries which may actually di¤er in the relationship
between R&D subsidies and growth.
We nd robust evidence in this paper of a positive impact of shocks to direct R&D subsidies
on the path of Total Factor Productivity (TFP) and output. The results of our test suggest that
increases in R&D subsidies generate medium term growth episodes. Simulating the estimated
model shows that a one-o¤, temporary increase in R&D subsidies of 0.01 above trend leads to
an average higher growth rate of 0.11 percentage points per annum over nearly two decades
(70 quarters). Our power exercise implies the uncertainty interval for this average growth rate
impact is (0.06, 0.17) percentage points per annum.
A review of some existing literature on R&D-driven growth is given in Section 2, focusing
on the macroeconomic literature. Section 3 outlines the DSGE model including the growth
process. Empirical work follows in Section 4, including an outline of the methodology and
data, estimation results and a variance decomposition for the estimated DSGE model. We
also report the results of our Monte Carlo exercise on the power of the testing method applied
here, as well as simulation results for a controlled temporary R&D policy reform using the
estimated model. Section 5 concludes.
2. LITERATURE
In the New Endogenous Growth theory, spillovers overcome diminishing returns to accu-
mulable factors in the aggregate production function, generating sustained economic growth.
They also undermine private incentives to innovate since the innovator cannot appropriate the
full return from his investment (e.g. Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Romer, 1990). Supposing that
a downward incentive e¤ect dominates, the broad avour of policy recommendations coming
out of these models is that research activities should be subsidised directly  or indirectly
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through scal incentives  in order to bring private returns into line with the social rate, and
that protection of intellectual property rights should be increased, enabling the innovator to
appropriate more of the returns to his investment despite the non-rivalry of knowledge outputs.
The underlying structure of the environment can also play a role, depending on the particular
model; competition policy and the reduction of barriers to entry and other market frictions
may increase the innovation rate (see discussion in Aghion et al. 2013).
Pure endogenous growth models in the style of Romer (1990) predict large long-run growth
responses to changes in the scale of the economys R&D sector; but while R&D activity (in
terms of labour inputs and investment) increased dramatically in the last century, long-run
growth rates were largely stable. Since Jones (1995), a second generation of semi-endogenous
R&D-driven growth models has emerged which imply a weaker scale e¤ect, allowing R&D
and policies incentivising it to have important transitional e¤ects on growth but not to deter-
mine the long-run. The choice of semi- versus fully endogenous growth mechanism can imply
signicantly di¤erent optimal R&D tax and subsidy policies; see Sener (2008) for discussion.
We discuss semi-endogenous growth, given our own empirical focus on the transitional growth
e¤ects of R&D policy.
A number of existing DSGE models explore the macroeconomic impacts of R&D poli-
cies by simulation, embedding a semi-endogenous R&D-driven growth mechanism and making
additional modelling choices which o¤er various insights. For instance, policymakers may
increase innovation through the R&D channel by subsidising human capital accumulation,
exploiting complementarities between the two activities that arise through the use of highly
skilled workers as an input to the R&D process. This complementarity is modelled in Papa-
georgiou and Perez-Sebastian (2006) and explored in Varga and tVeld (2011) among others.
Cozzi et al. (2017) take a Schumpeterian approach in which the technology frontier evolves
semi-endogenously, combining creative destruction with price stickiness.
McMorrow and Roeger (2009) examine the impact of R&D policy on growth in a global
DSGE model calibrated to the EU and to the US. They add the semi-endogenous growth mech-
anism in Jones (1995) to the European Commissions QUEST III model (Ratto et al. 2009),
nding that subsidies to R&D make only a modest contribution to productivity growth. The
supply of high-skilled workers is constrained so the subsidy impact is largely absorbed by in-
creases in researcher wages (cf. Goolsbee, 1998). Of course the overall impact is constrained by
the semi-endogenous growth assumption. In the short run there is reallocation of high-skilled
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labour from the production sectors to the research sector, which dampens output directly
following the reform (this is the case in the model we propose as well).
A key issue in such models is calibration of the R&D externality parameter.7 This is
generally either set based on the panel econometric literature or set indirectly by other para-
meter choices, themselves calibrated to results from econometric studies (e.g. Papageorgiou
and Perez-Sebastian, 2006). McMorrow and Roeger (2009) calibrate externalities to panel
regression estimates from Bottazzi and Peri (2007) and Coe and Helpman (1995). Bye et al.
(2011) use a CGE model of a small open economy calibrated to Norway to simulate innovation
policy reforms; while they calibrate the growth process from econometric results, they note
that estimates are scarce for their purposes and rely heavily on sensitivity tests. Of course
the simulated policy impacts produced from calibrated DSGE models depend strongly on cal-
ibration choices. The di¢culties of interpretation posed by macro-level regressions of growth
or productivity on policy variables are well known  causality is hard to establish and the
scarcity of strong, exogenous instruments for potentially endogenous regressors leaves such
regressions prone to bias.8 We therefore opt not to calibrate the growth process in our model
from this literature, given that the magnitude of the parameter on R&D policy is pivotal for
our conclusions.
Other notable papers in this literature are Comin and Gertler (2006) and Comin et al.
(2009). Against a US real business cycle backdrop they use a modied expanding varieties
mechanism for technological change but add a role for technology absorption, where absorption
is costly. Though some parameters are estimated using Bayesian methods, the technological
parameters are still calibrated from econometric studies: Comin and Gertler (2006) readily
acknowledge the di¢culty of calibrating these parameters and that estimates are "crude"
(p.541).
Cozzi et al. (2017) estimate structural parameters for a New Keynesian creative destruction
model of the US using Bayesian methods, including the parameters featuring in the growth
process. The structure of their model di¤ers from ours, but we note their relatively high
estimate of the intertemporal knowledge spillover parameter. This implies that shocks a¤ecting
R&D intensity will have long-lasting macroeconomic e¤ects. They also nd a high persistence
7Where international spillovers are included there is both a domestic R&D externality parameter and an
international externality to be calibrated.
8Macro-regression studies are often defended on the grounds that they help us update our priors about the
impact of certain types of policies (Rodrik, 2012, p. 141) and that even simple or partial correlations can
restrict the range of possible causal statements that can be made (Wacziarg, 2002, p. 909), but when models
are not identied it is not clear that this is defensible.
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for exogenous R&D policy shocks, consistent with our own results below. For other more
recent contributions using a mixture of Bayesian estimation and calibration see Anzoategui
et al. (2017) and Bianchi et al. (2014). Moran and Queralto (2018) use identied VARs to
estimate the impact of R&D on TFP.
We prefer a frequentist estimation strategy here since our reading of the empirical literature
does not suggest an appropriate prior for parameters governing the R&D subsidy impact in
our UK model. The approach taken here also allows us to evaluate the models performance
together with the estimated parameter, using the Indirect Inference test. Formal economet-
ric evaluation of DSGE models is now receiving increasing attention in the literature; see
Giacomini (2013).
Before presenting the UK model in the next section, we highlight some of our modelling
choices in the context of the DSGE literature discussed here  one notable di¤erence being
that we abstract from knowledge spillovers in the growth process. Growth occurs in this model
due to the representative agents decision to spend time innovating; the resulting innovation
is excludably donated to the rm, of which the agent is sole shareholder.9 The assumption
simplies the model considerably while allowing the important testable policy implication to
emerge, that R&D subsidies stimulate productivity growth by o¤setting frictional barriers to
R&D which tend to raise its costs. Thus we simply assume the existence of a distortion in
the R&D margin which subsidies can eliminate; for instance, the fact that R&D tends to be
risky which increases the cost of raising capital. The broader DSGE literature accomodates
increasing theoretical complexity which is insightful; our aim is to strip back this complexity
for the time being and see whether we nd robust empirical evidence for a simple DSGE model
in which R&D subsidies cause TFP behaviour. This is a nontrivial question, since there is a
strong possibility that the causation works in the opposite direction, or that the e¤ect is simply
negligible and that an exogenous growth model is more appropriate. If support is found for
the simple mechanism we propose here, we can proceed to model the microfoundations with
more complexity.10
9While the rm makes zero prots, the agent obtains the full benet of productivity increases through
resulting real wage increases.
10 If, however, we start with a very specic model of the R&D process, it could be rejected if any details are
wrong.
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3. MODEL
We adapt the open economy Real Business Cycle model in Meenagh et al. (2010), adding
an endogenous growth process based on Meenagh et al. (2007).11 It is a two-country model
with a single industry; one broad type of consumption good is traded internationally, but home
goods sector production is di¤erentiated from the foreign product. Consumers demand both
home goods and imported goods. The home country is calibrated to the UK economy and the
foreign country represents the rest of the world; its size therefore allows us to treat foreign
prices and consumption demand as exogenous. International markets are cleared by the real
exchange rate.
The model is a standard UK workhorse in terms of expected macroeconomic and open
economy reactions. It is used as a testing vehicle to examine whether the productivity path
is systematically a¤ected by shocks to R&D subsidies in the UK  a relationship derived
below from the models microfoundations. This model has the added practical advantage for
the UK of capturing real exchange rate movements while abstracting from monetary policy,
which underwent several regime changes in the UK during this period.12 To give power to our
empirical test, we must use a long sample spanning 1981-2010, but for this period we would
have trouble specifying a single monetary policy rule without including structural breaks. This
is one practical reason to exclude nominal frictions.13 Moreover, R&D works on the supply
side of the economy and in the medium and long run these e¤ects should not be much if at
all dependent on nominal rigidities (see e.g. the e¤ects of R&D policy in Varga and tVeld,
2011, Figure 1, p.658-59). This lends theoretical support to our decision to use an RBC model
for this exercise.14 Since this UK model has performed well in similar tests (Meenagh et al.,
2010), the introduction of the R&D policy variable should test whether this policy hypothesis
alone has caused the rejection.
11The UK is a highly open economy and we judge that openness to be an important feature in an empirical
analysis such as this.
12Policy went from money supply-targeting, to semi-o¢cially shadowing the Deutsche Mark, joining and
leaving the European Exchange Rate Mechanism, and nally to ination-targeting with Central Bank inde-
pendence.
13Others e.g. Varga and tVeld (2011) in QUEST III use a short sample, 2000-2006, enabling them to include
monetary policy rules of that period; but they do not wish to test the model for which they would need a much
longer sample, encountering the same issues as we do.
14 In the model we explicitly include dynamics due to real rigidities like adjustment costs, but simply include
any omitted e¤ects of nominal rigidities in the residual terms implied by the data.
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3.1. Consumer Problem
The consumer chooses consumption (Ct) and leisure (xt) to maximise lifetime utility, U :
U = maxE0[
1X
t=0
tu(Ct; xt)] (1)
u(:) takes the form:
u(Ct;xt) = 0
1
(1  1)
tC
(1 1)
t + (1  0)
1
(1  2)
tx
(1 2)
t (2)
1; 2 > 0 are coe¢cients of relative risk aversion; t and t are preference shocks, and 0 <
0 < 1 is consumption preference.
The agent divides time among three activities: leisure, labour Nt supplied to the rm for
the real wage wt, and an activity zt that is unpaid at t but known to have important future
returns. The time endowment is:
Nt + xt + zt = 1 (3)
Here the consumer chooses leisure, consumption, domestic and foreign bonds (b, bf ) and bonds
issued by the rm to nance its capital investment (~b), and new shares (Sp) purchased at price
q, subject to the real terms budget constraint.15
Ct + bt+1 +Qtb
f
t+1 + qtS
p
t +
~bt+1 = wtNt   Tt + bt(1 + rt 1)+
Qtb
f
t (1 + r
f
t 1) + (qt + dt)S
p
t 1 + (1 + r^t 1)
~bt
(4)
The taxbill Tt is dened further below. The only taxed choice variable in the model is zt;
all other taxes are treated as lump sum to rule out wealth e¤ects. Since the choice of zt is
left aside until Section 3.4 on endogenous growth, the taxbill is not relevant at this stage of
the problem. Qt =
P
f
t
Pt
:E^t gives relative consumer prices. The nominal exchange rate E^t is
assumed xed; Qt is then the relative import price.
16 Higher Qt implies a real depreciation
of domestic goods on world markets and hence an increase in competitiveness; this can be
thought of as a real exchange rate depreciation.
The consumers rst order conditions yield the Euler equation (5), the intratemporal con-
15Price Pt of the consumption bundle is numeraire
16 b
f
t+1 is a real bond - it costs what a unit of the foreign consumption basket (C

t ) would cost, i.e. P

t (the
foreign CPI). In domestic currency, this is P t E^t. Assuming P

t ' P
f
t (i.e. exported goods from the home
country have little impact on the larger foreign country) the unit cost of bft+1 is Qt.
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dition (6),17 real uncovered interest parity (7), and the share price formula (8). First order
conditions on ~bt+1 and bt+1 combine for r^t = rt. Indeed, returns on all assets (S
p
t , bt+1,
~bt+1
and bft+1) are equated.
1
(1 + rt)
tC
 1
t = Et[t+1C
 1
t+1 ] (5)
Ux
Uc
jU=0 =
(1  0)tx
 2
t
0tC
 1
t
= wt (6)
(1 + rt) = Et
Qt+1
Qt
(1 + rft ) (7)
qt =
qt+1 + dt+1
(1 + rt)
=
1X
i=1
dt+i
i 1Q
j=0
(1 + rt+j)
(8)
Equation 8 rests on the further assumption that qt does not grow faster than the interest rate,
limi!1
qt+i
i 1Q
j=0
(1+rt+j)
= 0.
The domestic country has a perfectly competitive nal goods sector, producing a version of
the nal good di¤erentiated from the product of the (symmetric) foreign industry. The model
features a multi-level utility structure (cf. Feenstra et al. 2014). The level of Ct chosen above
must satisfy the expenditure constraint,
Ct = p
d
tC
d
t +QtC
f
t (9)
pdt 
Pdt
Pt
. Cdt and C
f
t are chosen to maximise ~Ct via the following utility function (equation
10), subject to the constraint that ~Ct 6 Ct.
~Ct = [!(C
d
t )
  + (1  !)&t(C
f
t )
 ] 
1
 (10)
At a maximum the constraint binds; 0 < ! < 1 denotes domestic preference bias. Import
demand is subject to a shock, &t. The elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign
varieties is constant at  = 11+ . First order conditions imply the relative demands for the
imported and domestic goods:
Cft
Ct
=

(1  !)&t
Qt

(11)
Cdt
Ct
=

!
pdt

(12)
17Later we show that the return on labour time, wt, is equal at the margin to the return on zt.
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Given equation 11 above, the symmetric equation for foreign demand for domestic goods
(exports) relative to general foreign consumption is
(Cdt )
 = Ct
  
1  !F

&t
F
(Qt )
 F (13)
* signies a foreign variable; !F and F are foreign equivalents to ! and . Qt is the foreign
equivalent of Qt, import prices relative to the CPI, and lnQ

t ' ln p
d
t   lnQt.
18 An expression
for pdt as a function of Qt follows from the maximised equation 10:
1 = !(pdt )
 + [(1  !)&t]
Qt (14)
A rst order Taylor expansion around a point where pd ' Q ' & ' 1, with  = 1, yields a
loglinear approximation for this:
ln pdt = k^  
1  !
!
1

ln &t  
1  !
!
lnQt (15)
The export demand equation is then
ln(Cdt )
 = c+ lnCt + 
F 1
!
lnQt + "ex;t (16)
where c collects constants and "ex;t = 
F [ln &t +
1 !
!
1

ln &t].
Assuming no capital controls, the real balance of payments constraint is satised.
bft+1 = r
f
t b
f
t +
pdtEXt
Qt
  IMt (17)
3.2. Firm Problem
The representative rm produces the nal good via a Cobb Douglas function with constant
returns to scale, where At is total factor productivity:
Yt = AtK
1 
t N

t (18)
18Qt =
Pdt
Pt
- since Qt =
P
f
t
Pt
and Pt is numeraire, Qt = P
f
t . If domestic export prices hardly inuence the
foreign CPI then P t ' P
f
t .
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There are diminishing marginal returns to labour and capital. The rm also faces convex
adjustment costs to capital. The rm undertakes investment, purchasing new capital via debt
issue (~bt+1) at t; the cost r^t is payable at t+1. Bonds are issued one for one with capital units
demanded: ~bt+1 = Kt:The cost of capital covers the return demanded by debt-holders, capital
depreciation  and adjustment costs, ~at.
19 The prot function is:
t = Yt   ~bt+1(r^t +  + t + ~at)  ( ~wt + t)Nt
~wt is the real unit cost of labour; t and t are cost shocks capturing random movements in
marginal tax rates. The consumers rst order conditions showed r^t = rt. Substituting for
~bt+1 = Kt and r^t = rt, prots are:
t = Yt  Kt(rt +  + t) 
1
2
(Kt)
2   ( ~wt + t)Nt (19)
Here adjustment costs are explicit, having substituted ~bt+1~at = Kt~at =
1
2(Kt)
2. Parameter
 is constant.
The rm chooses Kt and Nt to maximise expected prots, taking rt and ~wt as given.
Assume free entry and a large number of rms operating under perfect competition. The
optimality condition for Kt equates the marginal product of capital (net of adjustment costs
and depreciation) to its price, plus cost shock  d is the rms discount factor. Rearranged,
this gives a non-linear di¤erence equation in capital.
Kt =
1
1 + d
Kt 1 +
d
1 + d
EtKt+1 +
(1  )
(1 + d)
Yt
Kt
 
1
(1 + d)
(rt + ) 
1
(1 + d)
t (20)
Given capital demand, the rms investment, It, follows via the capital accumulation identity.
Kt = It + (1  )Kt 1 (21)
The optimal labour choice gives the rms labour demand condition:
Nt = :
Yt
~wt + t
(22)
19 the adjustment cost attached to ~bt+1 is: ~bt+1~at = ~bt+1:
1
2


~bt+1 +
~b2t
~bt+1
  2~bt

= 1
2
(~bt+1)2
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Internationally di¤erentiated goods introduce a wedge between the consumer real wage, wt,
and the real labour cost for the rm, ~wt.
20 The wedge is
pdt =
wt
~wt
(23)
implying, via 15, the following relationship:
lnwt = k^ + ln ~wt  
1  !
!
lnQt  
1  !
!
1

ln &t (24)
3.3. Government
The government spends on the consumption good (Gt) subject to its budget constraint.
Gt + bt(1 + rt 1) = Tt + bt+1 (25)
Spending is assumed to be non-productive (transfers). As well as raising tax revenues Tt the
government issues one-period bonds. Each period, revenues cover spending and the current
interest bill: Tt = Gt + rt 1bt and so bt = bt+1. Therefore government debt is xed in the
model. Revenue Tt is made up as follows.
Tt = t   stzt (26)
st is a proportional subsidy rate on time spent in activity zt. t, a lumpsum tax capturing the
revenue e¤ects of all other tax instruments, responds to changes in stzt to keep tax revenue
neutral in the government budget constraint. Government spending is modeled as an exogenous
trend stationary AR(1) process.
lnGt = go + g1t+ g lnGt 1 + g;t (27)
where j g j< 1 and g;t is a white noise innovation.
20The rms real cost of labour is the nominal wage Wt relative to domestic good price, P dt , while the real
consumer wage is Wt relative to the general price Pt.
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3.4. Productivity Growth
Assume that productivity growth is a linear function of time spent in some innovation-
enhancing activity zt.
At+1
At
= a0 + a1zt + ut (28)
where a1 > 0. zt is the systematic channel through which policy incentives, st, drive growth.
21
Here zt is assumed to be time spent in R&D.
The model is similar to Lucas (1990) where growth depends on time spent accumulating
human capital. In the short term the return to labour (for a given level of human capital) is
foregone to raise the human capital stock. The endogenous growth process below is adapted
from Meenagh et al. (2007) to a decentralised framework.
Although in equation (28) TFP is a linear function of zt, in practice we model zt as a
stationary mean zero variable. If zt was non-stationary then a shock to it would be permanent
and would raise the balanced growth rate. This would produce endogenous growth but is
inconsistent with the data: resources devoted to R&D have increased dramatically over the
long term, while long run output growth has been broadly stable (cf. Jones, 1995). In other
words, equation 28 would imply that TFP is I(2), which is not supported. The model we set
up therefore features a mechanism whereby temporary shocks to R&D around an exogenous
trend generate permanent changes in the level of TFP and output, but cannot ultimately
a¤ect the long run growth rate of the model. It thus generates similar behaviour to models of
semi-endogenous growth in response to R&D policy.22 ,23
The consumer chooses zt to maximise utility (eqn.s 1 and 2), subject to equations 3 ,4 and
26. We assume the consumers shareholdings are equivalent to a single share:24 Spt = S = 1.
The rational agent expects zt to raise her consumption possibilities through her role as the
rms sole shareholder. She knows that, given equation 28, a marginal change in zt permanently
raises productivity from t+1. This higher productivity is fully excludable and donated to the
atomistic rm she owns; higher productivity is anticipated to raise household income via rm
21All other factors that systematically a¤ect growth are therefore in the error term.
22 In e.g. Jones (1995) and Segerstrom (1998) this is because the marginal idea product of R&D diminishes
as the level of R&D increases, due to shing out or increasing complexity. A permanent subsidy increase
then results in a permanent increase in R&D, but with level rather than growth e¤ects on long run output per
worker.
23zt is not in the model in practice when it is solved but, conceptually, any deterministic trend has been
removed. Likewise, a deterministic trend is removed from s0t and all other exogenous variables before solving
the model. See Sections 3.6 and 4.7.1
24This allows the substitution in the budget constraint that qtS
p
t   (qt + dt)S
p
t 1 =  dt.
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prots paid out as dividends, dt (everything leftover from revenue after labour and capital costs
are paid). The choice is thought not to a¤ect economy-wide aggregates; all prices are taken as
parametric (note that the productivity increase is not expected to increase the consumer real
wage here, though it does so in general equilibrium - cf. Boldrin and Levine, 2008).25
Substituting into the rst order condition for zt using equation 28 and rearranging for
At+1
At
yields (after some approximation)
At+1
At
= a1:

1 
: Yt
Ct
wt
Ct
(1  s0t)
(29)
The full derivation is given in the Appendix. We focus on st
wt
 s0t, a unit free measure with
the dimensions of a rate unlike st which, like the wage, is an amount payable per unit of time.
A rst order Taylor expansion of the righthand side of equation 29 around s0t = s
0 gives a
linear relationship between At+1
At
and s0t of the form
d lnAt+1 = b0 + b1s
0
t + "A;t (30)
where b1 = a1:

1 
Y
C
w
C
(1 s0)2 .
26 Note that this relationship came out of the rst order condition for
zt. The household chooses zt taking all other sources of productivity growth as exogenous.
Equation 30 drives the behaviour of the model in simulations.
There are notable aspects of the R&D growth channel that we abstract from here. We do
not include distance to the global technological frontier (cf. Grossman and Helpman, 1991); nor
do we explicitly include spillovers in the micro-foundations (e.g. inter alia Jones, 1995). Many
more theoretically rich models exist for how R&D subsidies can a¤ect productivity, and there
is no suggestion that growth is in reality as simple as this model suggests. The decision we have
made is to write down a straightforward and more general model which implies the reduced
form process in equation 30; we view this model as representative of a class of theoretical
models which have this implication. We then look at whether the approximations made here
are empirically justiable.
The growth channel, activity zt, is identied in empirical work by the choice of data for
the policy variable s0t; zt itself does not feature in the model listing (Appendix B). The policy
25Given the time endowment 1 = Nt+xt+zt , the agent has indi¤erence relations between zt and xt, between
xt and Nt, and zt and Nt. The intratemporal condition in 6 gives the margin between xt and Nt; here we
focus on the decision margin between zt and Nt, so the margin between zt and xt is implied. Therefore the
substitution Nt = 1  xt   zt can be made in the budget constraint.
26Other terms in the expansion are treated as part of the error term.
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variable is proxied by the rate of direct subsidies to private sector R&D; see Section 4.2.2. The
most obvious way such a subsidy could drive growth would be by stimulating R&D activity,
but this identication strategy does not rule out other models with the same implication for
the e¤ect of R&D subsidies on productivity growth (even if that might be because R&D
subsidies simultaneously increase worker human capital through strategic complementarities
as in Redding, 1996). While in practice zt could comprise other mechanisms besides simple
R&D activity, our focus is on testing the relationship in equation 30 from subsidies to TFP.27
Substituting into 29 using 28 reveals a relationship between zt and s
0
t. Dene
@zt
@s0t
 c1 ,
assumed constant. This parameter enters the simulation explicitly in the producer labour cost
equation:
ln ~wt = const4 + 2 lnNt + 1 lnCt +

1  !
!

lnQt + 22c1s
0
t + ew;t (31)
where ew;t =   ln t + ln t +
1


1 !
!

ln &t  so the unit labour cost shock is a combination
of preference shocks to consumption and leisure and to import demand. This equation is
derived from the intratemporal condition (equation 6) which governs labour supply choices
(full derivation in Appendix). Since s0t is an incentive to R&D, c1 > 0 and hence
d ln ~wt
ds0t
> 0
and equally d lnNt
ds0t
< 0, as equation 31 is simply the labour supply condition rearranged. The
workers response to a higher subsidy rate on zt is to reduce time spent in ordinary employment.
3.5. Closing the model
Goods market clearing in volume terms is:
Yt = Ct + It +Gt + EXt   IMt (32)
All asset markets also clear.
A transversality condition is also required to ensure a balanced growth equilibrium is
reached for this open economy, to rule out growth nanced by insolvent borrowing rather
than growing fundamentals. The restriction on the balance of payments is that the long run
27 If the model were specied in non-stochastic form, government intervention would not be justied as there
are no explicit distortions leading to suboptimal R&D; the subsidy itself could then generate a suboptimal
welfare outcome. However, the models residuals include temporary and permanent welfare distortions, along
with nominal rigidities, the e¤ects of other tax instruments etc. See Brinca (2014) for the interpretation of
model residuals as e¢ciency wedges (also Sustek, 2011). Given the presence of distortions to R&D incentives
in the residuals, subsidies can be a second best policy. However, we intend this as a positive exercise into the
TFP e¤ects of subsidies and do not emphasise the welfare properties of the model.
16
change in net foreign assets (the capital account) is zero. At a notional date T when the real
exchange rate is constant, the cost of servicing the current debt is met by an equivalent trade
surplus.
rfT b
f
T =  

pdT :EXT
QT
  IMT

(33)
The numerical solution path is forced to be consistent with the constraints this condition places
on the rational expectations. In practice it constrains household borrowing since government
solvency is ensured already, and rms do not borrow from abroad. When solving the model,
the balance of payments constraint is scaled by output so that the terminal condition imposes
that the ratio of debt to gdp must be constant in the long run, b^ft+1 = 0 as t ! 1, where
b^ft+1 =
b
f
t+1
Yt+1
. The model is loglinearised before solution and simulation; the full model listing
is in Appendix B.
3.6. Exogenous variables
Stationary exogenous variables are shocks to real interest rates (Euler equation), labour
demand, real wages, capital demand, export demand and import demand. These are not
directly observed but are implied as the di¤erence between the data and the model predictions.
Those di¤erences ei;t are treated as trend stationary AR(1) processes:
ei;t = ai + bit+ iei;t 1 + i;t (34)
i;t is an i.i.d mean zero innovation term; i identies the shock. We model foreign consumption
demand, government consumption, foreign interest rates and policy variable s0t similarly. AR(1)
coe¢cients i are estimated. Where expectations enter, they are estimated using a robust
instrumental variable technique (Wickens, 1982; McCallum,1976); they are the one step ahead
predictions from an estimated VECM. Where ai 6= 0 and bi 6= 0, detrended residual e^i is used:
e^i;t = ie^i;t 1 + i;t (35)
e^i;t = ei;t   a^i   b^it (36)
The innovations i;t are approximated by the tted residuals from estimation of equation
35, ^i;t. The Solow residual lnAt is modelled as a unit root process with drift driven by a
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stationary AR(1) shock and by exogenous variable s0t, following equation 30.
lnAt = d+ lnAt 1 + b1s
0
t 1 + eA;t (37)
eA;t = AeA;t 1 + A;t (38)
Deterministic trends are removed from exogenous variables since they enter the models bal-
anced growth path. We focus here on how the economy deviates from steady state in response
to shocks  in particular, stationary shocks to R&D subsidies. Such shocks will have a per-
manent shift e¤ect on the path of TFP via its unit root. Due to their persistence they also
generate transitional TFP growth episodes above long-run trend. As mentioned in Section 3.4,
this is how we achieve consistency with the data given our linear specication in equations
(28) and (30).
4. EMPIRICAL WORK
4.1. Indirect Inference Methods
The model in the preceding section is tested and estimated using the Indirect Inference
method from Le et al. (2011). The approach is similar to traditional RBC moment-matching,
but adds a formal test for the closeness of moments. Samples generated from the bootstrapped
model and the observed data are described atheoretically by an auxiliary model, used as a basis
for the comparison. The full methodology is given in Le et al. (2016). We describe it briey
here.
Given parameter set , J bootstrap simulations are generated from the DSGE model.
Having added back the e¤ects of deterministic trends removed from shocks, an auxiliary model
is estimated for all J pseudo-samples. The estimated auxiliary model coe¢cient vectors aj (
j = 1; :::; J) yield the variance-covariance matrix 
 of the DSGE models implied distribution
for these coe¢cients. Hence the small-sample distribution for the Wald statistic WS() is
obtained:
WS() = (aj   aj())
0W ()(aj   aj()) (39)
aj() is the mean of the J estimated vectors andW () = 
()
 1 is the inverse of the estimated
variance-covariance matrix. The test statistic, WS(), is WS() = (^   aj())
0W ()(^  
aj())  this depends on the distance between aj() and ^, where ^ is the coe¢cient vector
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estimated from the UK data. Inference proceeds by comparing the percentile of the Wald
distribution in which the test statistic falls with the chosen size of the test; for 5% signicance, a
percentile above 95% signies rejection. We can present the same information as a Mahalanobis
distance or as a p-value.
For estimation, a simulated annealing algorithm performs the indirect inference Wald test
for points inside a bounded parameter space. We search for a structural parameter set such
that the restrictions the model imposes, including the causal relationship from R&D subsidies
to TFP, do not lead it to be rejected as a data generating process. This is discussed further
below.
4.2. Data
4.2.1. UK Macroeconomic Data
We use unltered data from 1981 to 2010. For problems inherent in data ltering see
e.g. Hamilton (2016). Here we are interested in relatively long growth episodes in response
to shocks propagated through non-stationary TFP; the risk of mistaking that response for a
change in underlying trend and removing it is high with the HP lter (cf. Comin and Gertler,
2006). The auxiliary model is therefore a Vector Error Correction Model since the data is non-
stationary; this is discussed further in section 4.3. Key UK macroeconomic data is plotted in
Figure 1. Data sources are listed in Appendix C.
4.2.2. Data on R&D Subsidies
The hypothesis is that b1 > 0 in equation 30, i.e. s
0
t encourages the growth driver zt;
dened here as R&D. Since zt itself is not included in model simulations, the choice of data for
st identies the growth channel, as mentioned earlier. The policy variable used is the ratio of
business-performed R&D expenditure (BERD) nanced directly by government, to the total
level of BERD (all sources of funding). We choose this proxy because s0t represents a unit-free
subsidy rate, which should be the amount given in subsidies as a percentage of the activity:
therefore the denominator is the amount of private sector R&D while the numerator is the
amount given in grants that make that activity cheaper.
Aggregate data on BERD is available from 1981 and is annual with missing values at 1982
and 1984. Missing values are interpolated as the arithmetic average of the two contiguous
values (robustness checks on the interpolation choice show it has no impact on results). The
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FIG. 1 Key quarterly UK data for 1980-2010.
ratio is interpolated from annual to a quarterly frequency using a constant average match in-
terpolation. Figure 2 plots the series for constant average and quadratic average interpolation.
The detrended subsidy variable is modeled as a persistent but stationary AR(1) process (see
exogenous variables section above).
This R&D subsidy variable excludes scal incentives to R&D which have increased in the
UK since 2000, so it is only a partial proxy for policy incentives to R&D. However, scal incen-
tives as measured by the OECD B-Index may a¤ect R&D and productivity growth di¤erently
to direct subsidies (e.g. Foreman-Peck, 2013), so it is not immediately clear that we should
combine them into a single index. Likewise, no indicator of intellectual property rights spans
a long enough timeframe for this investigation; and for the UK such an indicator would show
little time series variation. We could resort to patent counts to proxy innovation policy, but
a) these are an outcome and may not be a good proxy for policy and b) they respond in a
way that may have nothing to do with productivity (see e.g. van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie,
2011, for related literature). For these reasons, the subsidy variable employed here is preferred.
20
80 85 90 95 00 05 10 15
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
FIG. 2 Business R&D Subsidy Variable. Ratio of Government Funded BERD to Total BERD.
Constant and average match interpolation. Source, OECD
4.3. Auxiliary Model
The full solution to the structural model can be represented as a cointegrated VECM
rearranged as a VARX(1)  see Appendix D. The general form is
yt = [I  K]yt 1 +Kxt 1 + n+ t+ qt (40)
The error qt contains suppressed lagged di¤erence regressors, while t captures the deterministic
trend in xt (the balanced growth behaviour of the exogenous variables) a¤ecting both the
endogenous and exogenous variables. xt 1 contains unit root variables, present to control for
the impact of past shocks on the long run path of both x and y. This VARX(1) approximation
to the reduced form of the model is the unrestricted auxiliary model used to assess the closeness
of model-simulated samples to the observed data.
The focus is on the transitional growth of output and TFP and whether our assumptions
about the causal role of R&D policy are correct, so we use a directed Wald (Le et al. 2011).
Endogenous variables in the auxiliary VARX(1) are therefore output and TFP, while exogenous
lagged variables are the subsidy variable and net foreign assets, bft 1. The latter captures the
stochastic trend in the model through its unit root.
The test is whether the model replicates the features not just of output and productivity
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taken singly, but the joint behaviour of those variables conditional on the behaviour of any
non-stationary predetermined variables and of the policy variable. Although this VARX(1)
is a severe approximation of the models solution, the power of the test remains strong; the
small sample properties of Indirect Inferences are discussed for a variety of models in Le et al.
(2016). Since Monte Carlo studies can be model-dependent, we also investigate the power of
the test in this particular context in Section 4.6 below.
The vector aj used to construct the Wald distribution (eq. 39) includes OLS estimates
of coe¢cients on the lagged endogenous and exogenous variables, as well as the variances of
the tted auxiliary model errors; the same coe¢cients make up vector ^ estimated on the
observed data. The VARX errors are also tested for stationarity. The trend term in the
VARX(1) captures the deterministic trend in the data and simulations. Since the focus of the
study is on the stochastic trend resulting from the shocks, the deterministic trend is not part
of the Wald test on which the models performance is evaluated.
4.4. Indirect Inference Testing and Estimation Results
We estimate a number of the structural parameters of the model using Indirect Inference
and report those estimates as well as the Wald test statistic for the model with that set of
parameters. The structural parameters we estimate are listed in Table 3, Column 1. They
are generally preference-related parameters, as well as the policy-growth parameter, for which
no strong priors exist. Due to the attention paid in the literature to adjustment inertia in
the response of R&D to policy determinants (Guellec and van Pottelsberghe, 2000; Westmore,
2013; Di Comite et al. 2015), we also test and estimate the model with a 4 quarter lag
in the subsidy rate, whereas the baseline model assumes a 1 quarter lag. Some structural
model coe¢cients are kept xed throughout; see Table 1. Long-run ratios featuring in the
loglinearised model for M
Y
; X
Y
; Y
C
and G
C
are calibrated to UK post-war averages. X
C
and M
C
are
then set to be consistent with those values.
To initiate the Indirect Inference estimation process we must choose a starting set of struc-
tural parameters for the model. For most of the parameters, initial values are taken from
Meenagh et al (2010), since we have used that model as our starting point. However, the
model we investigate here features substantial modications around the role of R&D subsi-
dies, necessitating re-estimation of its structural parameters.28 For the initial value of b1, the
28The addition of the R&D process to the model changes the dynamic properties of the model, so the initial
calibration (based on a model without R&D, calibrated for a di¤erent sample) is unlikely to be correct. Indeed,
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Labour share in output,  0:7
Quarterly discount factor,  0:97
Quarterly capital depreciation rate,  0:0125
K=C 0:196
Y=C 1:732
M=C 0:369
X=C 0:361
G=C 0:442
X=Y 0:208
M=Y 0:213
Y=K 0:333
TABLE 1
Fixed structural parameters
impact of the subsidy shock on next periods TFP (equation 30), the macroeconometric liter-
ature does not o¤er a strong prior in terms of sign or magnitude. Estimates for the impact of
R&D on TFP and of direct subsidies on TFP or output growth vary across di¤erent regres-
sion models and estimators, for di¤erent samples and for di¤erent measures of R&D or of the
policy environment. The same holds for c1; compare e.g. Falk (2006) to Westmore (2013).
Lacking a compelling rationale for calibrating this model from the existing literature, starting
values chosen for these are 0:1 and 0:06 respectively, and we search around these values in the
estimation procedure.29
The initial parameter set is given in Appendix F, along with the implied AR(1) coe¢cients
for stationary exogenous variables. Analysis of impulse response functions show real business
cycle behaviour consistent with Meenagh et al. (2010); impulse responses for a one-o¤ policy
shock are likewise as expected. A preliminary to the estimation is to set bounds on the
parameter space; these are set at 30% either side of the initial calibration. If a parameters
starting value is inappropriate, the estimation process will move towards one of the initial
bounds, indicating that the bound should be shifted.
When the model is estimated by Indirect Inference a structural parameter set is found
such that the model is not rejected by the test. The estimates are shown in Table 3, with the
implied AR(1) coe¢cients for the exogenous variables in Table 4. For the parameters listed in
Table 3, column 3, the test statistic falls in the 77th percentile of the distribution, signifying
a comfortable non-rejection. Several coe¢cients have moved some way from their starting
when the Indirect Inference test is applied to the model with this calibration it is rejected.
29A small starting value for c1 is preferred since the labour supply e¤ects induced by policy change should
plausibly be small.
23
values. In terms of the key results of this study, the estimate for b1 is 0:0901. This is the
short run impact of a temporary shock to the direct R&D subsidy rate on TFP growth. To
see the longer run impact of a one-o¤ shock to the subsidy rate necessitates impulse response
analysis, which we present in Section 4.7. There we show that the estimated model presented
and tested here implies that a one-o¤, temporary shock to the R&D subsidy rate of magnitude
0:01 stimulates an average increase in the per annum output growth rate of 0:0011 lasting over
17 years. This is a reasonably impressive e¤ect for such a small shock. Such implications t
with the results of e.g. Varga and tVeld (2011, Fig.1) using QUEST III.
Assuming a 4 quarter lag for the impact of the subsidy shock yields a borderline non-
rejection with a Wald percentile of 94.48, obtained from a di¤erent structural parameter set
(Table 3, col. 4). This is a much weaker result.
4.5. Variance Decomposition
A variance decomposition for key variables with this coe¢cient set is reported in Table
2.30 See Appendix E for the full variance decomposition (all endogenous variables); here we
pick out output and TFP due to their relevance for the growth question, as well as labour
supply (impacted by the subsidy) and key open economy variables: the real interest rate,
real exchange rate and net foreign assets. The identied subsidy shock generates considerable
variability across all endogenous variables and accounts for 62:9% of total variance in TFP in
the estimated model, more than the independent shock to TFP.31 The estimated value of b1 is
clearly large enough to distinguish this model clearly from an exogenous productivity growth
model.
30We bootstrap the model and calculate the variance of the simulated endogenous variables generated by
each of the eleven shocks, taken one at a time. For each column, the cell values indicate the proportion of the
total model variance for that endogenous variable generated by each exogenous variable; columns of Table 2
sum to unity.
31The subsidy shock and shocks to eA;t are bootstrapped independently.
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r Output Labour Q NFA TFP
er 0:169 0:002 0:009 0:012 0:031 0:000
eA 0:231 0:350 0:228 0:300 0:012 0:371
eN 0:031 0:002 0:015 0:001 0:001 0:000
eK 0:160 0:025 0:045 0:014 0:012 0:000
ew 0:122 0:020 0:162 0:006 0:005 0:000
eX 0:034 0:010 0:103 0:145 0:653 0:000
eM 0:028 0:001 0:014 0:013 0:054 0:000
esubs 0:142 0:589 0:406 0:470 0:096 0:629
CF 0:005 0:002 0:016 0:036 0:131 0:000
rF 0:071 0:000 0:001 0:004 0:004 0:000
G 0:005 0:000 0:002 0:000 0:000 0:000
TABLE 2
Variance decomposition for key endogenous variables based on estimated parameter set 1.
NFA is Net Foreign Assets. Q is the real exchange rate.
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Estimates I Estimates II (4-quarter lag)
CRRA coe¢cient (Ct) 1 0:9712 0:7156
CRRA coe¢cient (xt) 2 1:5198 1:0674
Preference weight on Ct 0 0:5267 0:5657
Home bias in consumption ! 0:5431 0:7988
Foreign equivalent of ! !F 0:8819 0:7344
Import demand elasticity  0:7676 0:9380
Elasticity of substitution (Cdt ; C
f
t ) 
F 0:8522 0:5009
Capital equation coe¢cients 1; 2; 3; 4 0:63; 0:35; 0:02; 0:24 0:61; 0:37; 0:02; 0:20
@R&Dt
@s0t
c1 0:0632 0:0480
@[d lnAt+1]
@s0t
b1 0:0901 0:0969
Wald percentile 77:04 94:48
TABLE 3
Structural Model Parameters
Exogenous variable AR coe¢cient Estimated Model 1 Estimated Model 2
Shock to real interest rate r 0:858 0:839
Shock to TFP A 0:577 0:588
Shock to labour demand N 0:897 0:913
Shock to capital demand K 0:951 0:950
Shock to real wage  ~w 0:837 0:943
Shock to export demand X 0:939 0:938
Shock to import demand M 0:832 0:854
Shock to R&D subsidy S 0:974 0:971
Shock to foreign consumption demand CF 0:939 0:953
Shock to foreign real interest rate rF 0:851 0:837
Shock to government consumption G 0:972 0:951
TABLE 4
AR coe¢cients for stationary exogenous variables
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Extent of falseness (absolute),  TRUE 0.50% 1.00% 1.50% 2.00% 2.50% 3.00%
Rejection rate 5% 5.80% 8.82% 26.58% 84.68% 100.0% 100.0%
TABLE 5
Rejection rates, all coe¢cients falsied together
4.6. Power Exercise
The small sample properties of Indirect Inference have been investigated elsewhere (see
Le et al. 2016 for references). However, Monte Carlo results are di¢cult to generalise from
one context to another so we check the power of the Indirect Inference test for our particular
setup. To do this, we introduce falseness into the structural parameters, , moving them away
from predened true values by a certain percentage (randomly in either a positive or negative
direction). Using a bootstrapped Wald distribution based on the misspecied model, we see
whether the Indirect Inference test as implemented above will correctly reject this model given
a sample from the true (correctly specied) model. The rate at which the test statistic falls in
the 95th-100th percentile range of the distribution, for a particular degree of falseness, gives a
sense of how reliable the procedure is. Rejection rates are given in Table 5. The results of the
exercise indicate that the testing method applied in the study is powerful. Coe¢cients just
2.5% away from their true values will result in a certain rejection.
The above power function holds when all parameters are falsied together to the same
degree. We would most of all like to know whether the addition of the R&D subsidy is
appropriate. This policy a¤ects the model via parameters b1 and c1. We therefore investigate
the power of the test when these coe¢cients alone are misspecied, holding all other coe¢cients
to their true values. The results are reported in Table 6. When just two coe¢cients are falsied
the power of the test is reduced. However, the test rejects over 99% of the time when the
coe¢cients b1 and c1 are 50% away from their true values. This furnishes us with a condence
interval for our estimates.
What we see here is that our estimates lie within dened and rather close accuracy bounds.
The R&D parameter cannot lie outside the region (0.04, 0.14) or the model would have been
rejected; we conclude that R&D does a¤ect growth positively. More generally, we can be sure
that the models parameters must lie collectively within a range of 2.5% of their true values;
that is to say, if they were all perturbed randomly more than this percentage, the model would
be rejected.
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Falseness (%) 0 1 3 5 7 10
Rejection rate (%) 5.0 5.34 5.98 7.22 8.88 12.84
Falseness (%) 15 20 30 40 50 60
Rejection rate (%) 23.62 40.72 75.94 94.22 99.18 99.88
Falseness (%) 0 -1 -3 -5 -7 -10
Rejection rate (%) 5.0 4.92 4.72 4.90 5.32 6.40
Falseness (%) -15 -20 -30 -40 -50 -60
Rejection rate (%) 10.54 18.64 55.92 93.52 99.94 100.0
TABLE 6
Rejection rates when just two structural coe¢cients are falsied
4.7. Policy Reform and Growth Episode
A temporary shock to the detrended R&D subsidy has the e¤ect in the model of increasing
the level of TFP permanently and also generates a long-lasting TFP growth episode, with
knock-on e¤ects on the rest of the economy. We conduct impulse response analysis for a
one-o¤, 1 percentage point shock to s0t. More precisely, all exogenous innovations are set to
zero for all t except for the innovation s;t in the subsidy shock process (see model listing,
Appendix B). Given s0t = ss
0
t 1 + s;t and s;0 = 0:01 with s;t = 0 for t > 0, we track
how this impulse is transmitted to the rest of the model through equation 30 and 31. As an
exogenous innovation, s;0 = 0:01 is unexpected but its persistence is expected by rational
agents who are assumed to know the structure of the model. The simulation is based on the
estimated structural parameter set found above. Impulse responses are shown in Figure 3.
After 70 quarters the loglevel of output is 2 percentage points higher than its no shock state
(note, balanced growth has been removed here). The average annual growth increase over the
17.5 year episode is therefore 0:11 percentage points per annum.32
How condent can we be in these results? The power exercise above shows that the Indirect
Inference test (exactly as applied in this paper) is robust against misspecication in the models
structural parameters. In our worst case scenario in which only the R&D subsidy parameters
are misspecied, we found that these estimates can deviate by up to 60%; that is, b1 lies in the
interval (0.04, 0.14). We use this to construct the uncertainty interval for the average annual
growth increase resulting from the temporary policy reform as (0.06, 0.17) percentage points
per annum. Supposing some misspecication in all the estimates together, the uncertainty
32We also carry out a one-o¤ permanent reform. As equation (30) would suggest, this changes the drift
term in TFP, implying an increase in the balanced growth rate of the model and so a much larger impact.
However, such a non-stationary specication for the subsidy variable would render TFP I(2) given our modelling
assumptions and, though illustrative as a one-o¤ policy experiment, is at odds with the data features we aim
to match.
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FIG. 3 Impulse Responses for a 1 pc point increase in R&D subsidies; 70 quarters.
interval would be considerably smaller as the test would tolerate only 2.5% misspecication in
the R&D subsidy coe¢cients.
There is the further issue of identication. Work checking the identication of rational
expectations DSGE models nds that they generally are overidentied (the notable exception
is models featuring sunspots); see Le et al. 2017. It is a priori likely that the model we use
here is identied since models of this type routinely pass identication tests, but in particular
we would like to show that the reduced form of this model could not be confused with a model
in which R&D subsidies respond endogenously to TFP. To check identication we apply the
numerical identication test developed by Le et al (2017).33 For this test a 5 variable VARX(4)
is used as the auxiliary model. We nd that when the structural parameters are falsied by
0.3% together (randomly, up or down), false models are rejected 100% of the time. Therefore
the VAR distribution implied by the true model is clearly distinguishable from that implied
by other models, even those with parameters in the near neighbourhood of the true set.
33The idea is to check whether any other structural model could generate the models reduced form by
creating a large number of data samples of large size from the true model, and testing whether any possible
alternative model is rejected for these samples at the same 5% rate as the true model itself.
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FIG. 4 R&D subsidy variable - various detrending methods
4.7.1. Robustness checks
Robustness checks show that results are invariant to the interpolation technique (quadratic
versus constant match) and to the way in which missing values were supplied for years 1982
and 1984.34 We also check the detrending method for the R&D subsidy variable. Though
direct subsidies have fallen steadily since the 1980s, from the late 1990s the trend slows. We
therefore try removing the trend using i) the HP lter and ii) a quadratic time trend (Fig.
4). The earlier results are robust for the HP ltered series  the coe¢cient set reported in
Table 3, column 4, is rmly not rejected with a test statistic in the 84th percentile of the Wald
distribution. With the quadratic time trend the model is rejected at the 5% signicance level.
5. CONCLUSION
We have written down a DSGE model particularly suited to the UK open economy in which
productivity is driven systematically by direct subsidies to private sector R&D. Structural
34Missing values were calculated as i) the average of two contiguous values, ii) equal to previous value, iii)
equal to following value. The Wald test result was similar for all three.
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models of this kind are valuable tools for policymakers, but it is increasingly recognised that
the value of their quantitative implications rests on the credibility of the structural parameters.
Taking our cue from the incipient literature estimating and evaluating DSGE models, we
estimate and test the model by Indirect Inference for the period 1981  2010: Our test focuses
on whether the model can explain output and productivity as endogenous variables, and we
nd that it does. The estimated impact of current direct subsidies to private R&D on total
factor productivity growth one-quarter ahead, b1, is 0:09, signifying that in this sample a 1
percentage point increase in the detrended ratio of government funded BERD to total BERD
raises productivity by 0:09 percent over the quarter, with permanent e¤ects on the level. Given
the estimated structural model, we conduct a simulated policy reform experiment. A one-o¤,
one percentage point increase in direct subsidies dying out gradually generates a transitional
growth episode in TFP lasting nearly two decades. This translates into an increase in the
average annual growth rate of output of 0:2 percentage points over those decades. Our results
thus strongly suggest that there is a role for R&D subsidies in promoting or maintaining growth
in the medium term.
The power exercise we conduct lends signicant robustness to these conclusions on the role
of R&D subsidies. In our Monte Carlo study, the introduction of 2.5% misspecication in the
structural parameters leads to a 100% rejection rate. When falseness is introduced only into
the two coe¢cients particularly related to subsidies (b1 , c1) the test is still sure to reject the
model when these two parameters stray further than 50% from their true values. This allows
us to construct uncertainty bounds around our estimates (and hence around the predicted
growth episode): in the case of b1; the worst case interval is (0:04; 0:14).
We also apply the numerical model identication test proposed in Le et al. (2017), and
conrm that the model is identied. This is a key strength of the approach, as there is no
ambiguity in the causality running between policy shocks and economic growth. A model in
which growth causes policy, for example, would be clearly distinguishable from the model we
have tested here. Therefore this study adds empirical support for a causal impact of R&D
policy on transitional growth in the UK since the 1980s.
Finally, the study ts within a wider research agenda on the role of R&D policy in economic
growth in industrialised countries. The model abstracts heavily from the processes surrounding
the R&D investment decision and the way that direct subsidies enter it in practice. A more
elaborate model of the R&D channel could give greater insight into exactly how direct subsidies
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drive TFP at the level of microfoundations. In this study we provide evidence of the positive
direction of the subsidy impact and the extent of that e¤ect on the macroeconomy, ndings
which are certainly of interest to policymakers and which seem to be of rst order importance;
future work can build on this.
REFERENCES
[1] Aghion, P. and P. Howitt, (1992). "A model of growth through creative destruction," Economet-
rica 60, 323351
[2] Aghion, P. and U. Ackigit, P. Howitt (2013). "What Do We Learn From Schumpeterian Growth
Theory?" NBER Working Papers 18824
[3] Alvarez-Ayuso, I. & C. Kao & D. Romero-Jourdain (2018). "Long run e¤ect of public grants and
tax credits on R&D investment: A non-stationary panel data approach." Economic Modelling
(2018, in press)
[4] Anzoategui, D. and D. Comin, M. Gertler, J. Martinez (2017). "Endogenous Technology Adoption
and R&D as Sources of Business Cycle Persistence." New York University Working Paper 2017
[5] Arrow, K. (1962). "The economic implication of learning by doing." Review of Economics and
Statistics, 80, 155173.
[6] Becker, B. (2015). "Public R&D policies and private R&D investment: A survey of the empirical
evidence." Journal of Economic Surveys, 29(5), 917-942.
[7] Bianchi, F. and H. Kung, G. Morales (2014). "Growth, Slowdowns, and Recoveries" NBER
Working Papers 20725
[8] Bloom, N., & R. Gri¢th & J. Van Reenen (2002). "Do R&D tax credits work? Evidence from a
panel of countries 1979-1997." Journal of Public Economics, 85(1), 1-31.
[9] Boldrin, M. & D. Levine (2008). "Perfectly competitive innovation", Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics, 55(3), 435-453
[10] Bottazzi, L. and G. Peri (2007). "The International Dynamics of R&D and Innovation in the
Long Run and in the Short Run," Economic Journal, 117, 486-511.
[11] Bournakis, I. & S. Mallick (2018). "TFP estimation at rm level: The scal aspect of productivity
convergence in the UK," Economic Modelling, 70, 579-590.
[12] Brinca, P. (2014). Distortions in the neoclassical growth model: A cross-country growth analy-
sis, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 47, 1-19
[13] Bye, B. and T. Faehn, L. A. Grunfeld (2011) Growth and Innovation Policy in a Small, Open
Economy: Should You Stimulate Domestic R&D or Exports?, The B.E. Journal of Economic
Analysis & Policy: 11 (1)
[14] Coe, D. and E. Helpman (1995). International R&D spillovers. European Economic Review,
39(5), 859-887
[15] Comin, D. and M. Gertler (2006). "Medium-Term Business Cycles." American Economic Review
96(3), 521-551
[16] Comin, D. and M. Gertler, A. Santacreu (2009). "Technology Innovation and Di¤usion as Sources
of Output and Asset Price Fluctuations." NBER Working Papers 15029
[17] Cozzi, G. and B. Pataracchia, P. Pfei¤er, M. Ratto (2017). "How much Keynes and how much
Schumpter? An estimated macromodel of the US economy" Munich Personal Repec Archive,
MPRA Paper No. 77771, March 2017.
32
[18] Danguy, J. and G. de Rassenfosse, B. van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2014). "On the origins
of the worldwide surge in patenting: an industry perspective on the R&D-patent relationship."
Industrial and Corporate Change, Vol. 23(2), 535-572.
[19] David, P. & P. Hall & A. Toole (2000). "Is public R&D a complement or substitute for private
R&D? A review of the econometric evidence." Research Policy, 29(4-5), 497-529.
[20] Di Comite, F. and A. Kancs (2015) "Macro-Economic Models for R&D and Innovation Policies."
European Commission JRC Technical Reports. IPTS Working Papers on Corporate R&D and
Innovation - No 02/2015
[21] Falk, M. (2006). "What drives business Research and Development (R&D) intensity across Or-
ganisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries?" Applied Economics,
38(5), 533-547
[22] Feenstra, R., and P. Luck, M. Obstfeld, K. Russ (2014). "In search of the Armington elasticity,"
NBER Working paper No. 20063, April 2014.
[23] Foreman-Peck, J. (2013). "E¤ectiveness and e¢ciency of SME innovation policy," Small Business
Economics. 81(1)
[24] Giacomini, R. (2013). "The relationship between DSGE and VAR models" in T. Fomby, L. Kilian
and A. Murphy eds., Advances in Econometrics: VAR Models in Macroeconomics, Financial
Econometrics, and Forecasting - New Developments and Applications (Volume 31, 2013)
[25] Goolsbee, A. (1998). "Does government R&D policy mainly benet scientists and engineers?"
American Economic Review, 88(2), 298-302
[26] Grossman, G. & E. Helpman (1991). Innovation and Growth in the Global Economy. Mass: MIT
Press, 1991.
[27] Gri¢th, R. & S. Redding, J. Van Reenen (2003). "R&D and absorptive capacity: Theory and
Empirical Evidence," Scandinavian Journal of Economics 105(1), 99-118
[28] Griliches, Z. (1958). "The Demand for Farm Fertilizer: An Econometric Interpretation of a
Technological Change," Journal of Farm Economics, 40(3), 591-606
[29] Guellec & van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2000). "The Impact of Public R&D Expenditure on
Business R&D," OECD Science, Technology and Industry Working Papers 2000/4
[30] Hall, B. & J. Mairesse & P. Mohnen (2010) "Measuring the returns to R&D." Handbook of the
Economics of Innovation. Vol. 2, Ch. 24 1033-1082. Elsevier.
[31] Hamilton, J. (2016). "Why you should never use the Hodrick-Prescott lter," Technical report,
Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
[32] HM Government (2017). "Building Our Industrial Strategy" Green Paper, Jan. 2017
[33] Jones, C.I. (1995). Time series tests of endogenous growth models. Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, (110), p. 495-525.
[34] Le, V. P. M. and D. Meenagh, P. Minford, M. Wickens (2011). "How much nominal rigidity
is there in the US economy? Testing a new Keynesian DSGE model using indirect inference,"
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 35(12), 2078-2104
[35] Le, V. P. M. and D. Meenagh, P. Minford, M. Wickens (2017). "A Monte Carlo procedure for
checking identication in DSGE models," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 76(C),
202-210.
[36] Le, V. P. M. and D. Meenagh, P. Minford, M. Wickens, Y. Xu (2016). "Testing Macro Models
by Indirect Inference: A Survey for Users," Open Economies Review, 27(1), 1-38
[37] Lucas, R. E. (1990). "Supply-Side Economics: An Analytical Review", Oxford Economic Papers,
42(2), 293-316
33
[38] McMorrow, K. and W. Roeger (2009). R&D capital and economic growth: The empirical evidence.
EIB Papers, Vol. 14, Iss. 1, 94-118
[39] Meenagh, D. and P. Minford, E. Nowell, P. Sofat, (2010). "Can a real business cycle model without
price and wage stickiness explain UK real exchange rate behaviour?," Journal of International
Money and Finance, 29(6), 1131-1150
[40] Meenagh, D. and P. Minford, J. Wang, (2007). "Growth and relative living standards - testing
Barriers to Riches on post-war panel data," CEPR Discussion Papers 6288, C.E.P.R. Discussion
Papers.
[41] McCallum, B. (1976). "Rational expectations and the natural rate hypothesis: some consistent
estimates." Econometrica, 44. 43-52
[42] Moran, P. and A. Queralto (2018). "Innovation, productivity and monetary policy." Journal of
Monetary Economics, Vol. 93
[43] OECD (2016), "Tax incentives for R&D and innovation", in OECD Science, Technology and
Innovation Outlook 2016, OECD Publishing, Paris.
[44] Papageorgiou, C. and F. Perez-Sebastian (2006) "Dynamics in a non-scale R&D growth model
with human capital: Explaining the Japanese and South Korean development experiences." Jour-
nal of Economic Dynamics and Control 30, 901-930
[45] Ratto M, and W. Roeger, J. in t Veld (2009). QUEST III: An Estimated Open-Economy DSGE
Model of the Euro Area with Fiscal and Monetary Policy. Economic Modelling, 26, 222-233
[46] Redding, S. (1996). The Low-Skill, Low-Quality Trap: Strategic Complementarities between
Human Capital and R&D. Economic Journal, 106 (435), 458-70.
[47] Rodrik, D. (2012). "Why we learn nothing from regressing economic growth on policies." Seoul
Journal of Economics Vol. 25, No. 2, pp. 137-151, 2012
[48] Romer, P. (1990). "Endogenous Technological Change," Journal of Political Economy, 98:5, 71-
102.
[49] Schultz, T. (1953). The Economic Organization of Agriculture. New York: McGraw-Hill
[50] Segerstrom, P. (1998) "Endogenous Growth without Scale E¤ects." American Economic Review,
88(5), 12901310
[51] Sener, F. (2008) "R&D policies, endogenous growth and scale e¤ects." Journal of Economic
Dynamics and Control, 32, 3895-3916
[52] Sustek, R. (2011). Monetary Business Cycle Accounting, Review of Economic Dynamics, 14
(4), 592-612
[53] van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, B. (2011). "The quality factor in patent systems," Industrial
and Corporate Change, 20(6), 1755-1793
[54] Varga J. and J. in t Veld (2011). "A Model-based Analysis of the Impact of Cohesion Policy
Expenditure 2000-06: Simulations with the QUEST III endogenous R&D model," Economic
Modelling, 28, 647-63
[55] Wacziarg, R. (2002) "Review of Easterlys The Elusive Quest for Growth." Journal of Economic
Literature 40 (No. 3) 907-18
[56] Westmore, B. 2013. "R&D, Patenting and Growth: The Role of Public Policy" OECD Economics
Department Working Papers No. 1047
[57] Wickens, M. (1982). "The e¢cient estimation of econometric models with rational expectations."
Review of Economic Studies, 49, 55-67.
APPENDIX A: MODEL DERIVATIONS, CONT.
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A.1. First order condition for z
The rst order condition for zt is:
dL
dzt
= 0 =  ttwt + 
t
tst + Et
1X
i=1

t+i
t+i:
d dt+i
dzt
At the (Nt; zt) margin, the optimal choice of zt trades o¤ the impacts of a small increase dzt on labour
earnings, subsidy payments, and expected dividend income. Here,
dAt+i
dAt+i 1
=
At+i
At+i 1
and hence for
i  1,
d At+i
dzt
=
d At+i
dAt+i 1
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a1. In turn,
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=
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a1:
It may be objected that dzt enhances output directly through its e¤ect on productivity (holding inputs
xed), and also induces the rm to hire more capital to exploit its higher marginal product (similarly
for labour). We assume the e¤ect of dzt on the future dividend (dt+i = t+i) is simply its direct
e¤ect via higher TFP, on the basis that any e¤ects on input demands are second order. Therefore
the expected change in the dividend stream is based on forecasts for choice variables (set on other
rst order conditions) that are assumed independent of the agents own activities in context of price
forecasts; she anticipates only the e¤ect of zt on the level of output that can be produced with given
inputs from t+ 1 onwards. With substitution from 28, the rearranged rst order condition is:
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On the left hand side is the return on the marginal unit of Nt, the real consumer wage; on the right is
the present discounted value of the expected increase in the dividend stream as a result of a marginal
increase in zt, plus time t subsidy incentives attached to R&D activity.
35 Substituting again from 28
for zt yields
At+1
At
= a1:
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i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The preference shock to consumption, t, is an AR(1) stationary process t = t 1 + ;t. Setting
1 ' 1,
Ct
Yt
is approximated as a random walk, so Et
Yt+i
Ct+i
= Yt
Ct
for all i > 0.36 The expression becomes
At+1
At
= a1:

1 
: Yt
Ct
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Ct
(1  s0t)
where st
wt
 s0t; see main model discussion.
A.2. The labour supply response to subsidies
Taking the total derivative of the time endowment in 3 gives dxt =  dNt dzt, or
dxt
xt
=  dNt dzt
xt
.
Taking N  x  1
2
in some initial steady state with approximately no z activity implies dxt
x
= d lnxt 
 d lnNt  
dzt
N
=  d lnNt   2dzt. Substituting into the loglinearised intratemporal condition using
this and 24, we obtain
d lnNt   2c1ds
0
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1
2
d ln t +
1
2
d ln t  
1
2
d lnCt+
1
2
h
k + d ln ~wt  
1


1 !
!

d ln &t  

1 !
!

d lnQtg
i
Integrating and rearranging for the log of the real unit cost of labour to the rm, ln ~wt, gives expression
ln ~wt = const4 + 2 lnNt + 1 lnCt +

1 !
!

lnQt   22c1s
0
t + ew;t (see main text).
APPENDIX B: THE LINEARISED SYSTEM
35The non-policy cost of generating new productivity via zt is assumed to be zero.
36Although in balanced growth C
Y
is constant, in the presence of shocks the ratio will move in an unpredictable
way (see Meenagh et al. 2007 for discussion).
35
The linearised system of optimality conditions and constraints solved numerically is given below.
Each equation is normalised on one of the endogenous variables (constants are suppressed in the
errors). Variables are in natural logs except where already expressed in percentages. For clarity,
ln(Cdt )
 and lnCft are denoted lnEXt and ln IMt.
rt = 1 (Et lnCt+1   lnCt) + er;t (42)
lnYt =  lnNt + (1  ) lnKt + lnAt (43)
lnNt = lnYt   ~wt + en;t (44)
lnKt = 1 lnKt 1 + 2 lnKt+1 + 3 lnYt   4rt + ek;t (45)
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APPENDIX C: DATA DEFINITIONS AND SOURCES
Most UK data are sourced from the UK O¢ce of National Statistics (ONS); others from the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), Bank of England (BoE), UK Revenue and Customs (HMRC)
and Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). All data seasonally adjusted
and in constant prices unless specied otherwise.
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Symbol Variable Denition and Description Source
Y Output Gross Domestic Product; constant prices. ONS
N Labour Ratio of total employment to 16+ working population1 ONS
K Capital Stock Calculated from investment data (I) using Eqn.21 (na)
I Investment Gross xed capital formation + changes in inventories ONS
C Consumption Household nal consumption expenditure by households ONS
A Total Factor Productivity Calculated as the Solow Residual in Eqn. 18 (na)
G Government Consumption General government, nal consumption expenditure ONS
IM Imports (also Cft ) UK imports of goods and services ONS
EX Exports (also Cdt ) UK exports of goods and services ONS
Q Terms of Trade Calculated from E:PF
P
(na)
E Exchange Rate Inverse of Sterling e¤ective exchange rate ONS
PF Foreign Price Level Weighted av. of CPI in US (0.6), Germany (0.19) & Japan (0.21) IMF
P Domestic General Price Level Ratio, nominal to real consumption ONS
bF Net Foreign Assets Ratio of nominal net foreign assets (NFA) to nominal GDP
2 ONS
w Consumer Real Wage Average Earnings Index 3 divided by Pt ONSew Unit cost of labour Average Earnings Index 3 divided by GDP deator ONS
r Real Interest Rate, Domestic Nominal interest rate minus one period ahead ination. (na)
R Nominal Interest Rate, Domestic UK 3 month treasury bill yield BoE
rF Real Interest Rate, Foreign RF minus one-period ahead ination (year-on-year change in PF ) (na)
RF Nominal Interest Rate, Foreign Weighted av., 3-month discount rates, US, Germany & Japan
4 IMF
CF Foreign Consumption Demand World exports in goods and services IMF
s
0
R&D Subsidy, Direct BERD funded by government as proportion of total BERD OECD
TABLE 7
Data Description
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Notes to Table:
1 Working population is total claimant count plus total workforce jobs.
2 Nominal NFA is accumulated current account surpluses (£m), taking the Balance of Payments
international investment position as a starting point.
3 AEI for whole economy including bonuses.
4 Weights as for PF . Germany proxies EU.
BERD is Business Enterprise R&D.
APPENDIX D: AUXILIARY MODEL
The full linearised structural model, comprising a p x 1 vector of endogenous variables yt, a
r x 1 vector of expected future endogenous variables Etyt+1, a q x 1 vector of non-stationary variables
xt and a vector of i.i.d. errors et, can be written in the general form
A(L)yt = BEtyt+1 + C(L)xt +D(L)et (58)
xt = a(L)xt 1 + d+ b(L)zt 1 + c(L)t (59)
xt is a vector of unit root processes, elements of which may have a systematic dependency on the lag
of zt , itself a stationary exogenous variable (this variable is subsumed into the shock below). t is an
i.i.d., zero mean error vector. All polynomials in the lag operator have roots outside the unit circle.
Since yt is linearly dependent on xt it is also non-stationary. The general solution to this system is of
the form
yt = G(L)yt 1 +H(L)xt + f +M(L)et +N(L)t (60)
where f is a vector of constants. Under the null hypothesis of the model, the equilbrium solution for
the endogenous variables is the set of cointegrating relationships (where  is p x p )37 :
yt = [I  G(1)]
 1[H(1)xt + f ] (61)
= xt + g (62)
though in the short run yt is also a function of deviations from this equilbrium (the error correction
term t):
yt   (xt + g) = t (63)
In the long run, the level of the endogenous variables is a function of the level of the unit root variables,
which are in turn functions of all past shocks.
yt = xt + g (64)
xt = [1  a(1)]
 1[dt+ c(1)t] (65)
t = 
t 1
s=0"t s (66)
Hence the long-run behaviour of xt can be decomposed into a deterministic trend part x
D
t = [1  
a(1)] 1dt and a stochastic part xSt = [1 a(1)]
 1c(1)t, and the long run behaviour of the endogenous
variables is dependent on both parts. Hence the endogenous variables consist of this trend and of
deviations from it; one could therefore write the solution as this trend plus a VARMA in deviations
from it. An alternative formulation is as a cointegrated VECM with a mixed moving average error
term
yt =  [I  G(1)](yt 1  xt 1) + P (L)yt 1 +Q(L)xt + f + !t (67)
!t = M(L)et +N(L)"t (68)
which can be approximated as
yt =  K[yt 1  xt 1] +R(L)yt 1 + S(L)xt + h+ t (69)
37 In fact the matrix  is found when we solve for the terminal conditions on the model, which constrain the
expectations to be consistent with the structural models long run equilibrium.
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or equivalently, since yt 1  xt 1   g = 0,
yt =  K[(yt 1   yt 1) (xt 1   xt 1)] +R(L)yt 1 + S(L)xt +m+ t (70)
considering t to be i.i.d. with zero mean. Rewriting equation 69 as a levels VARX(1) we get
yt = [I  K]yt 1 +Kxt 1 + n+ t+ qt (71)
where the error qt now contains the suppressed lagged di¤erence regressors, and the time trend is
included to pick up the deterministic trend in xt which a¤ects both the endogenous and exogenous
variables. xt 1 contains unit root variables which must be present to control for the impact of past
shocks on the long run path of both x and y. This VARX(1) approximation to the reduced form of
the model is the basis for the unrestricted auxiliary model used throughout the estimation.
APPENDIX E: VARIANCE DECOMPOSITION (ALL VARIABLES)
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r Y N K C w ~w X M Q bF A d(A)
Shock to r 0:16915 0:00197 0:00946 0:01392 0:04238 0:03864 0:00063 0:01232 0:06000 0:01156 0:03056 0 0
Shock to TFP 0:23125 0:34965 0:22750 0:21159 0:23919 0:11268 0:35403 0:31997 0:14627 0:30031 0:01221 0:37125 0:90164
Shock to N 0:03092 0:00198 0:01529 0:00104 0:00167 0:02777 0:01385 0:00073 0:00006 0:00069 0:00074 0 0
Shock to K 0:16036 0:02454 0:04456 0:41922 0:02423 0:01442 0:01927 0:01438 0:00731 0:01350 0:01233 0 0
Shock to w 0:12176 0:01992 0:16159 0:01146 0:01462 0:03621 0:00125 0:00653 0:00058 0:00613 0:00491 0 0
Shock to X 0:03448 0:01006 0:10313 0:00026 0:16463 0:44235 0:00103 0:10006 0:37763 0:14460 0:65353 0 0
Shock to M 0:02802 0:00123 0:01439 0:00062 0:02004 0:03956 0:00022 0:01404 0:09832 0:01318 0:05384 0 0
Subsidy shock 0:14243 0:58885 0:40561 0:33892 0:41954 0:15387 0:60936 0:50078 0:17308 0:47001 0:09621 0:62875 0:09836
CF shock 0:00527 0:00159 0:01643 0:00006 0:06412 0:11844 0:00017 0:02681 0:12097 0:03590 0:13144 0 0
rF shock 0:07095 0:00009 0:00053 0:00285 0:00928 0:01594 0:00016 0:00423 0:01577 0:00397 0:00392 0 0
G shock 0:00539 0:00012 0:00150 0:00006 0:00030 0:00014 0:00002 0:00013 0:00001 0:00013 0:00031 0 0
TABLE 8
Variance Decomposition, Subsidy Model 1
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Starting calibration
CRRA coe¢cient (Ct) 1 1:0
CRRA coe¢cient (xt) 2 1:2
Preference weight on Ct 0 0:5
Home bias in consumption ! 0:7
Foreign equivalent of ! !F 0:7
Import demand elasticity  1:0
Elasticity of substitution (Cdt ; C
f
t ) 
F 0:7
Capital equation coe¢cients38 1; 2; 3; 4 0:51; 0:47; 0:02; 0:25
@R&Dt
@s0t
c1 0:06
@[d lnAt+1]
@s0t
b1 0:1
Wald percentile 100
TABLE 9
Initial set of structural model parameters, based on Meenagh et al. (2010)
APPENDIX F: INITIAL STRUCTURAL PARAMETER SET
The structural parameter set in Table 9 based on Meenagh et al. (2010) was used to initiate the
Indirect Inference estimation process, which searched over points in the parameter space dened by
the 30% bounds around these values (see Section 4.4). Table 10 gives the implied AR(1) coe¢cients
for the exogenous variables.
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Exogenous variable AR coe¢cient Starting calibration
Shock to real interest rate r 0:860
Shock to TFP A 0:589
Shock to labour demand N 0:897
Shock to capital demand K 0:765
Shock to real wage  ~w 0:879
Shock to export demand X 0:939
Shock to import demand M 0:848
Shock to R&D subsidy S 0:974
Shock to foreign consumption demand CF 0:939
Shock to foreign real interest rate rF 0:851
Shock to government consumption G 0:972
TABLE 10
Starting AR coe¢cients for stationary exogenous variables
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